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A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING PRODUCT 
INNOVATION STRATEGIES IN A 
COMPETITIVE CONTEXT 
Patrick J. Rondeau and Bhal J. Bhatt 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of new products capable of satisfying customer demands on a 
timely basis has become a priority for firms seeking to improve their competitive 
advantage in a global context. 
However, this challenge has become highly complex due to a growing diversity 
of both products and processes, higher costs, and unprecedented considerations 
for quality and service (Bolt, 1988). Despite knowing a great deal about both the 
characteristics of successful firms and new product development processes, little 
is known regarding requisite guidelines for successful strategies in product 
development. 
Kantrow (1980), among others, has identified market, customer, organizational, 
and managerial characteristics of firms that have been successful in new product 
development. Others have attempted to identify the product, manufacturing, and 
information technologies that surround successful product development processes 
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(Morton,' 1983; Stoubaugh andTelesio, 1983; Wheelwright, 1984; Zirger and 
Modesto, 1990). In bOth cases, the focus has been on describing the general activities 
that firms have engaged in to improve product development success as well as overall 
competitive advantage. ' ~, 
Hence, a critical need exists fora' framework to guide the creation of product 
development strategies that is based upon an examination of the relationship between 
product innovation and the 'competitive nature of technologies. We propose the 
construction of such a fraIl1ework through an integration of Tushman and Nadler's 
(1986) levels of innovation with Johnson's (1987) levels of technology to create 
a 3X3 matrix of product innovatio"nltechnology positions. Within this framework, 
the product development process is discussed and an innovation index is proposed 
, by which a fiflnlmiy assess arid preposition product performance. 
LITERATURE REVIEW. 
lohne and Snelson (1989) have classified the development of new products in terms 
of either old product development (OPD)'or new product development (NPD) efforts. 
OPD is primarily concerned with protecting or extending the market share of existing 
products through their redevelopment or revision to better fit current market demands. 
NPD is concerned with the creation and development of totally new products that 
define new markets or capture specific segments of existing markets not previously 
addressed by a firm. 
In a majority of cases, however, new products are essentially "spin-offs" of 
pre-existing families of products and contain only minor improvements over their 
predecessors. As such, relatively few new products may be classified as truly new 
and revolutionary in nature. Furthermore, when comparing OPD versus NPD 
processes, NPD processes will often carry a higher risk of failure than will OPD 
. processes. This is primarily because OPO efforts are: (1) normally based upon 
a successful line of existing products; and (2) often utilize proven technologies and 
processes in which the firm has had extensive prior experience (Johne and Snelson, 
1989). 
A firm's initial reaction might be to embrace and exclusively pursue the apparent 
safety 'of an OPO strategy. However, a long-term failure to pursue totally new 
products might also prove disastrous if competitors were to succeed in their NPD 
activities. A firm must therefore identify and achieve a proper balance between 
its need to attain greater technical synergies with its need to produce truly new 
and innovative products capable of defending or expanding market share (Link, 
1987; Paul, 1987). This may require firms to simultaneous engage in the pursuit 
of both NPO and OPD activities. Accordingly, a need for the subsequent development 
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of better methods for assessing and understanding the innovation/technology 
relationship within and between firms clearly exists to enable the creation of more 
effective long-term product development strategies. 
LEVELS OF PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION 
Tushman and Nadler (1986) describe product and process innovation as occurring 
on one of three levels. The first is incremental innovation where added features, 
new versions, or extensions to existing product lines are implemented in small steps. 
While this often results in lower costs of product development and reduced risk, 
it may also yield a lower return on investment (ROI) for the firm. However, when 
managed well these smaller but more consistent product and process improvements 
(i.e., learning curve effects) can add up to create significant gains by substantially 
extending old product's lives. 
The second, synthetic innovation, occurs when the firm combines existing 
technologies and ideas in new and never previously done ways to create significantly 
new products. Synthetic improvements usually set new standards in some way 
for an existing product class and often result in sharp improvements in process 
scope, volume, or capacity (Le., medium innovation steps). As a result, they are 
associated with a medium level of potential cost, risk, and ROI. 
The final level, discontinuous innovation, involves the creation of significantly 
new technologies or ideas resulting in the development of previously non-existent 
products (i.e., large innovation steps). Totally new process methods and technologies 
are often required for product development and manufacture. Successful discontinuous 
innovation may result in the creation of totally new products which may render 
entire classes of products obsolete. Accordingly, discontinuous innovation is usually 
associated with the highest potential level of product costs, risks, and ROI. 
THE COMPETITIVE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGIES 
To better understand the conditions under which simultaneous NPD and OPD efforts 
could lead to improved product development success, it is necessary to explore 
the competitive nature of technologies. In either NPD or OPD, product innovations 
by themselves mayor may not lead to improved competitive success. For example, 
while an individual innovation may be both highly original and creative, it may 
not be considered successful if it satisfies a relatively limited customer demand. 
An assessment of the competitive nature of products in terms of their form and 
function as well as their production processes is required. For this purpose, Johnson's 
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(l987)fra~ework is utilized to better vncterstand what he describes as base, key, 
and pacing technologies. 
, Base.T~chnol~giesare common to the majority of industry competitors and their 
products. As such, base techno}<?gies no longer fonn the primary basis of competitive 
advantage for the firm. T~ey are most closely associated with old product 
'redevelopment efforts aridcostIeadership strategies. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, pacing technoiogies:areoftenunavaiIabIe to the majority of industry 
competitors. They are new:technologies, currently in the earliest stages of 
. development, with the potential to iadically change the future basis of competitive 
advantage. Pacing technologies are most closely associated with "pure" new product 
..• development efforts and product differentiation strategies. Falling between base 
and pacing technologies, key technologies are common to a small group of industry 
competitors and their products, fornimg the immediate basis of competitive advantage 
for these firms. 
It is interesting to note that normal product evolution eventually results in pacing 
technologies becoming key technologies and key technologies becoming base 
technologies as product and process innovations evolve from the highly unique 
and previously nonexistent to common and highly routine in nature. As these new, 
more productive and cost effective technologies emerge, they are first adopted by 
industry leaders and later, adopted by industry followers. This results in a 
technological diffusion cycle whereby leading finns will continuously attempt to 
push towards the next level of pacing technologies from key technologies and follower 
, firms will push towards key technologies (often abandoned by leading firms) from 
base technologies . 
.. ' THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
Based on the foregoing, a 3X3 matrix interaction between innovation and technology 
characteristics is proposed (see Figure 1). Within this framework, each of the 
'technology categories (i.e., base, key, and pacing) represents the prevailing 
competitive conditions for a product or line of products associated with each of 
the levels of innovation (Le., incremental, synthetic, and discontinuous). As such, 
the framework demonstrates that it is most likely that pacing technologies will emerge 
from discontinuous innovation, but progressively less likely for pacing technologies 
to emerge from synthetic or incremental innovation. Similarly, base technologies 
are generally associated with incremental innovation but may also be associated 
with synthetic or discontinuous levels of innovation as well. 
FIGURE 1. 
Product Innovation/Technology Framework: 
Innovative/Positional Mode of the Firm 
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Also represented in Figure 1 are the ways in which we may also classify the firm 
as being either a leader or a follower in product innovation. Leaders introduce 
new products into the marketplace to gain competitive advantage over rival 
competitors. Leaders may be broad-span in nature and lead by introducing several 
new products into related markets at the same time. Or, leaders may be narrow 
span and lead by focussing entirely on introducing one (or a few) new products 
into a specific market at a time. In contrast, followers can be classified as being 
either committed or uncommitted positionals. Uncommitted positionals introduce 
new products only in response to competitive pressure from innovative market leaders. 
Committed positionals attempt to safeguard existing products from market leaders 
primarily through manufacturing process innovation and cost cutting (J ohne, 1987). 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
In examining matrix position 1-1, we find base technologies being designed and 
produced under conditions of incremental innovation. This matrix position is strongly 
associated with competitors who are industry followers in the uncommitted positional 
mode. These competitors may be characterized as initiating a minimum level of 
product development, engaging in incremental levels of operational and knowledge 
technology innovation, and doing so only in response to competitive pressure from 
market leaders. As a result, both the degree of risk of innovation and technology 
failure in the marketplace are lower than at any other position within the matrix. 
Matrix position 3-3 represents the direct opposite set of product development 
conditions to position 1-1. Position 3-3 can be most strongly associated with 
competitors who are narrow span industry leaders focussing entirely on introducing 
one or a few major products into a specific market at a time. The technology 
associated with this matrix position is often unavailable to the majority of industry 
competitors forming the basis for future competitive advantage. Competitors in 
this position normally engage in both discontinuous operational and knowledge 
technology innovation. Products originating from this matrix position represent 
the higpest possible degree of risk of innovation and technology failure among all 
matrix positions. In contrast to matrix position 1-1, position 3-3 represents a high 
level of short-term profitability risk, with the greatest long-term potential for improved 
profitability and competitive advantage attainable by a firm. 
Examining matrix positions 2-1 and 1-2, we find that finns in these positions can 
be characterized as industry followers in the committed positional mode. These 
firms attempt to safeguard existing base products through synthetic innovation (i.e., 
operational improvements) or to safeguard key technologies through incremental 
innovation (i.e., overhead reduction). In both cases, cost reduction to maintain 
ACR Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 9 
competitiveness is the primary objective. Product development in these matrix 
positions may be characterized by a medium level of innovation risk and a low 
level oftechnology risk (i.e., matrix position 2-1) or a low level of innovation risk 
and a medium level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position 1-2). In either case, 
a moderate level of profitability risk is tied to a medium level ROI. 
Examining matrix positions 2-2, 2-3, and 3-2, we find that firms in these positions 
can be characterized as broad-span industry leaders. These firms attempt to lead 
by improving existing key technology products through either synthetic or 
discontinuous innovation or attempt to introduce pacing technology products developed 
through synthetic innovation. In all three cases, various combinations of product 
cost reduction and product differentiation may be the primary objective. Product 
development in these matrix positions is characterized by either medium levels 
of innovation and technology risk i.e., matrix position 2-2), a high level of innovation 
risk and medium level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position 3-2), or a medium 
level of innovation risk and a high level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position 
2-3). All three combinations carry a moderate degree of profitability risk tied to 
medium to high levels of ROI. 
The final two matrix positions, 3-1 and 1-3, represent the least likely, but not totally 
improbable, innovation/technology positions. Similar to matrix positions 2-1 and 
1-2, firms in positions 3-1 and 1-3 may be characterized as industry followers in 
the committed positional mode. Firms in position 3-1 attempt to safeguard existing 
base products through discontinuous innovation efforts in the form of sophisticated, 
highly aggressive operational improvements. Firms with products in position 1-3 
attempt to change the basis of competition through incremental innovation efforts 
and highly aggressive overhead reduction designed to make pacing technology products 
more affordable. In both cases, cost reduction to increase market share and 
profitability are primary objectives. 
Product development in position 3-1 is characterized by a high level of innovation 
risk and a low level of technology risk. Alternately, product development in position 
1-3 is characterized by a low level of innovation risk and a high level of technology 
risk. In both positions, a moderate level of profitability risk tied to a medium level 
of ROT exists. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The increased emphasis on technological synergy may force many firms to reevaluate 
how they manage their future product development activities. In response, Shrivastava 
and Souder (1987) have defined a set of three technology phase transfer models 
(Le., stage, process, and task-dominant models) for managing the product development 
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~r~ess. A~raphic~eprese~tation of the po~itionirig of each technology phase transfer 
model within the innovationltechllology framework appears in Figure 2. 
· . The first of these models is. the stage~dominant model which is predominantly 
· characterized by the. use of strong, .functionally specialized groups. In the 
stage-dominaIlt model, predefined tasks are ,organized by function and performed 
in "proper functional sequence" for greater projectefficiency. Product development 
is often defined in terms of specific functional responsibilities and boundaries. 
· This is supported by formal technology transfer" points between functions in the 
product development process. As such, the stage-dominant model is most ideally 
oriented towards the management of base technologies under conditions of incremental 
innovation. However, it may also prove to .be effective for the management of 
product development for base techIiologies .. uIlder synthetic innovation or key 
technologies under conditions of incremental innovation. 
The second technology phase transfer model is the process-dominant model. In 
this model, functional boundaries still exist but are reduced in importance. More 
informal groupings of project team members as well as informal technology transfer 
points exist between functions. Functional involvement and activities are continually 
redefined. Product development is often specified in terms of the functional 
interaction required to complete project tasks. This model is often thought of as 
the compromise or transition between the stage and task-dominant models. The 
process dominant model can be most closely associated with the management 
of key teChnologies under conditions of incremental, synthetic, or discontinuous 
innovation. However, it may also be associated with base technologies under 
conditions of synthetic or even discontinuous innovation as well as pacing technologies 
under synthetic or incremental innovation. 
The third technology phase transfer model is the task-dominant model. This model 
rejects all efforts to group project team members by functional area. Instead, product 
development activities are defined and specified in terms of optimal task execution 
and completion. The focus is generally on NPD effectiveness. This results in 
continuous overlapping and blending of NPD efforts and communications between 
team members. The task dominant model is most closely associated with the 
. management of pacing technologies under discontinuous innovation. However, 
it may be an effective approach for managing the development of key technologies 
under conditions of discontinuous innovation or pacing technologies under synthetic 
innovation. 
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AN EXAMPLE: INTEL CORPORATION CPUS 
To better understand the innovation/technology framework, let us consider the example 
of Intel Corporation's computer central processor unit (CPU) business. Over the 
past 10 years, Intel has established itself as the dominant computer CPU manufacturer 
through a set of careful NPD and OPD strategies. These decisions have balanced 
Intel's need for market leadership with its investor's need to harvest value from 
their investment. Key to Intel's success has been the development of a clear strategy 
which emphasizes when to continue to extend existing products lives while at the 
same time pushing the development of new products. 
If we examine Figure 3 in detail, Intel's product development strategy becomes 
clear. Stage 1 in the life cycle of a CPU involves the development of a totally 
new processor under conditions of discontinuous innovation utilizing pacing 
technologies. A task dominant management model of the product development 
process is utilized to guide the process. The marketing focus is on creating new 
products which differentiate Intel from its competitors and firmly establishes its 
dominance as the market leader in CPUs. This focus not only ensures Intel's influence 
on PC hardware sales but has also ensured Intel's dominance over software 
development directions. It has also had the effect of severely limiting the influence 
of substitute product CPUs on the PC industry, thus not only controlling existing 
software development directions but also future directions. 
As a CPU "ages, II Intel's competitors eventually gain access and the ability to 
produce equivalent CPU technologies. Intel refocuses on the next generation of 
CPU s and the current processor enters stage 2 of the product development process. 
This stage is characterized by synthetic innovation using key technologies in which 
further development activities attempt to differentiate the existing product class 
from its competitors to retain the CPU's market leadership. The management process 
gradually switches to a more process dominant format. As such, the original 
processor's development path splits in three major directions: (1) an enhanced 
processor design in which subtle refinements are made (e.g., DX2); (2) a faster 
version of the existing processor design (e.g., DX replacement); and (3) a low 
cost, reduced feature design of the existing processor (e.g., SX). 
In the final stage of its life cycle, the processor becomes commonplace in nature 
with all competitors having access to the same product and process technologies. 
As the next generation of CPUs is released, the processor enters stage 3 of the 
product development process. This stage is characterized by incremental innovation 
using base technologies in which further development activities attempt to harvest 
any and all remaining value from the product. The management process continues 
to evolve to a stage dominant format. As such, the CPU's development path 
concentrates primarily on developing faster versions of the processor. The focus 
FIGURE 3. 
Product Innovation/Technology Framework: 
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of the enhancement process is to improve efficiencies until the product is no longer 
profitable. Finally, the product is abandoned altogether as further CPU developments 
continue to reduce market demand. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that mUltiple models of product development 
throughout the life span of a product may be necessary. In addition, we propose 
that the optimum product life cycle should closely follow the diagonal of the 
framework matrix. That is, products are born in cell 3-3 , expand to their full market 
potential and profitability in cell 2-2, and are managed to harvest all remaining 
residual value in cell 1-1. The maximum degree of deviation from this diagonal 
which is possible is governed by the competitive pressure applied on the firm by 
the nature and rate of substitute product introductions. Therefore, in the case of 
Intel previously discussed, we find that the high rate of technology deterioration 
over time greatly limits the degree of possible deviation from the optimum product 
development diagonal of cells. 
Of further interest when examining this example is understanding how Intel's 
competitors may implement product development strategies capable of breaking 
Intel's dominance over the PC CPU industry. Two obvious strategies exist. 
First, Intel's competitors may band together to develop an industry standard set 
of processor operation rules which are open to all competitors' use. These rules 
may be registered with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as ANSI 
standards, for example. The CPU manufacturers may then provide options such 
as financial support or technical assistance to major software development vendors 
to create open standard products which are compatible with proprietary Intel based 
software products. This would provide a more painless migration path to other 
vendors' products, which would reduce resistance to brand switching. 
The second option involves gaining the support of the primary PC operating system 
vendor, Microsoft Corporation, in developing a processor independent operating 
system. This option appears to be much closer to fruition in the recent release 
and announcement by Microsoft that its new Windows NT operating system will 
eventually run on all major processors. If this does indeed prove true, the potential 
is great for far reaching change to the CPU industry'S basis of competition and 
Intel's undisputed lead in processor development. 
DISCUSSION 
For the purposes of empirical verification, we propose the creation of a product 
innovation index which not only measures the innovativeness of a product but is 
also designed to measure its competitiveness. Such an index would be useful in 
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understanding the competitive nature of existing products' successes or failures. 
It would also be useful for the purpose of product prepositioning in terms of 
identifying open market segments or in identifying areas where existing products 
would be vulnerable to new product introductions by competitors. 
Four key dimensions of product and process innovation may be used in the evaluation 
of product development success. These dimensions include the machine, procedural, 
instrumental knowledge, and conceptual knowledge technologies of the firm. The 
machine and procedural technologies combine to create the firm's operational 
technology base and the instrumental and conceptual knowledge technologies combine 
to form its knowledge technology base. Operational technologies are defined as 
the set of instruments (Le., machines) and procedures (i.e., production processes) 
used by production operators to transform component and raw material inputs into 
final product outputs. Knowledge technologies are defined as the firm's available 
knowledge base (Le., human skills and experience) employed in inventing new 
products, designing technical systems, or in performing the work itself (Shrivastava 
and Souder, 1987). 
Having developed a framework for categorizing and relating the nature of innovation 
to technology, it becomes possible accurately to compare a firm's product and process 
strengths to those of its major competitors. Utilizing the four key dimensions of 
product and process innovation, an innovation index is proposed. This model seeks 
to evaluate different competitors' products, existing in different positions within 
the innovation/technology matrix, in a standardized manner, thereby making it possible 
to "pre-position" new products more effectively in relation to those of competitors. 
For purposes of future discussion we may now define the innovativeness of the 
firm as, 
where, 
If(m) 
If(p) 
If(c) 
If(k) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Innovativeness of Machine Technology 
Innovativeness of Procedural Technology 
Innovativeness ofInstrumental Knowledge Technology 
Innovativeness of Conceptual Knowledge Technology 
and each If(v) (f = firm 1, 2, 3, ... , x; v = innovation variable m, p, c, or k) 
is a qualitative variable whose value may be equal to 1 (incremental innovation), 
2 (synthetic innovation), or 3 (discontinuous innovation). 
While providing a good initial basis for evaluation, further improvement to adjust 
for changes in the basis of competition among industry competitors is required. 
A technology adjustment variable, Tj(f(v» (i = industry 1, 2, 3, ... , y) must be 
added to adjust for the competitive nature of technologies where Tj(f(v» represents 
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a qualitative variable whose value may be equal to 1 (base technology), 2 (key 
technology), or 3 (pacing technology). Substituting Ti(f(v» into I-Indexf results in 
a revised index which may be stated as, 
I-Indexi(f) = L Ii(f(v»· Ti(f(v» 
It is important to note that the innovativeness of the firm can not, in reality, be 
measured solely by internal standards. Before launching a new product, its innovation 
level must be measured and adjusted relative to competing firms at the same 
technology level within an industry. Therefore, an innovation adjustment coefficient, 
ai(f(v» is required for each innovation variable to adjust properly individual firm 
innovation levels relative to competitors. By this scenario, an ai(f(v» = 1.0 indicates 
the innovation assessment of the firm is accurate relative to its industry competitors. 
In its basic form, the innovation adjustment coefficient, ai(f(v), may be calculated 
as follows, 
Ii(f(v))Actual 
ai(f(v)) = 
Ii(v))Average 
Substituting <1j(f(v)) into I-Indexi(f)' we see that the industry adjusted product innovation 
index, in its final form, may be expressed as, 
I-Indexi(f) = L ai(f(v»· [Ii(f(v» • Ti(f(v»l 
We may further explore the behavior of the innovation adjustment coefficient, 
ai(f(v», within the product innovation/technology framework (see Figure 4). Products 
located within the diagonal of the matrix, extending from the upper right-hand comer 
to lower left-hand comer, can be said to demonstrate a balanced strategy. That 
is, a firm seeking to achieve: (1) a discontinuous level of innovation will utilize 
a pacing level of technology; (2) a synthetic level of innovation will use a key level 
of technology; and (3) an incremental level of innovation will use a base level of 
technology. Thus, in all three cases, the resulting value of ai(f(v» will equal 1.0. 
For products located in cells to the left of the diagonal of the matrix (Le., cells 
2-1, 3-1, and 3-2) we propose that ai(f(v» will be less than one. This implies that 
the true level of innovation of these products is less than the 1-Indexi(f) would otherwise 
indicate. In contrast, products located in cells to the right of the diagonal of the 
matrix (Le., cells 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3) will have an ai(f(v» value greater than 1.0. 
As ai(f(v)) decreases to the left of the diagonal and increases to the right of the diagonal, 
lower and upper innovation boundaries are formed indicating the outer limits at 
which successful new product development may occur. In the case of the lower 
boundary, further efforts to extend old product's lives are restricted by limited 
innovation opportunities associated with base technologies. In the case of the upper 
FIGURE 4. 
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boundary, further efforts to extend old product's lives through the use of pacing 
technologies are restricted by incompatibilities between each succeeding generation 
of technology. In both, the economics of extending old products' lives are directly 
impacted by the pace at which product innovation occurs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In closing, it is obvious that further research, in the form of empirical verification 
of the innovation/technology framework will be required. Particularly, the concepts 
related to the product development diagonals of the matrix, the movement of products 
along the diagonal, and the measurement of the competitiveness of innovations located 
within different matrix positions is required. However, we believe the framework 
itself provides a sound initial basis from which to explore the relationship between 
product innovation, the competitive nature of technologies, and product development 
success or failure. 
It is possible to draw three important conclusions related to the framework as 
discussed within this paper. First, the product innovation index, I-Indexi(t), is a 
composite score which reflects the potential competitiveness of a new product within 
the marketplace. It is not, however, an absolute indicator of the ultimate success 
of a new or revised product. In addition, while it is theoretically possible for two 
competing products to achieve identical overall index scores, it is much less likely 
that the individual innovation components comprising these scores will also be 
identical. Therefore, it is equally important to look at the framework positioning 
of individual components to gain a fuller understanding of the strategic implications 
of a firm's product offerings. The strategic implications have been discussed earlier 
in this paper. 
Second, the framework provides an equal basis by which a firm may benchmark 
its products against competitors' products to assess not only individual product 
strategies but also to evaluate entire groups of product strategies. More importantly, 
the regular benchmarking of competitors' products would allow for the continuous 
monitoring of patterns of product development as an indicator of business strategy. 
When extrapolated further, as in the case of Intel CPUs, the potential exists for 
these strategy patterns to be used against major competitors in the form of "blocking" 
moves designed to negate the strength of new product offerings. Such blocking 
moves may include new or improved features, lower costs, revised marketing 
strategies, and other actions timed to reduce the value of competing product offerings 
within the marketplace. 
Finally, because individual firm strategies, goals, and objectives will differ, so 
too will their approaches to product development. Such a view recognizes that 
it is possible to achieve competitive success via both new and/or old product 
development efforts through proper product timing and positioning. Thus, while 
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narrow span leaders, characterized by discontinuous innovation using pacing 
technology, have the greatest potential to change the basis of competition among 
competitors as well as to capture entire portions of new markets, these same firms 
also face the highest levels of technological and innovation risk in today's increasingly 
global business environment. Alternately, firms engaged in the continuous 
improvement of existing products often experience significantly reduced levels of 
risk as well as a more immediate return on investment. Therefore, when properly 
positioned in relation to competing products, sustained and highly significant levels 
of success may be maintained by existing products for relatively long periods of 
time. 
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